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a remnant chloroplast, with an
associated genome. Perhaps most
notorious among these is the world’s
most dangerous ‘alga’, the malaria
parasite Plasmodium [15]. Whether
anything has gone further and lost
both the chloroplast compartment
and its genome is less clear, although
Cryptosporidium, a relative of
Plasmodium, may have done so [16].
In the mitochondrial lineage, the
most plausible remaining role for
mitosomes is iron-sulphur cluster
biogenesis. However, in Entamoeba,
even this biogenesis function seems
to have been taken over by proteins
of non-mitochondrial origin. Their
location in the cell remains to be
established and so the role of
mitosomes in Entamoeba remains
unclear [17]. In Trachipleistophora
hominis, at least part of the
iron-sulphur-cluster biogenesis
pathway has been delegated to the
cytosol [18]. So there may well be
organisms where the whole of this
role has been delegated by the
mitochondrion, and where after over
a billion years of trying to make
themselves indispensable, the
mitochondrion and its descendants
have finally disappeared, like the
grin of Alice in Wonderland’s
Cheshire Cat.
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The mirror neuron system may help us understand how others act and what
they do. A recent study has shown that consciously reflecting on their
intentions additionally recruits mentalizing areas.
Marc Thioux, Valeria Gazzola
and Christian Keysers
You are a student interested in the
origin of life and have an appointment
with a renowned scholar in a cafe´.
When you arrive, he is already sitting
at the terrace, absorbed in a book.
You introduce yourself, and are invited
to take a seat. The conversation goes
on for an hour, then slows down. The
professor leans back into his chair
and reaches with his left hand for one
of the books on the table. Your
perception of this last action has
at least three levels. At the lowest,
most detailed level, you could perceive
how he performed this action: with
his left hand, using a whole hand
prehension. At the intermediate level,
you perceive what he is doing:
grasping a book. At the highest level
youmight perceivewhy he is doing it: to
signal that your conversation is over.
The last decade brought major
advances in our understanding of
the cerebral structures involved in
processing the how, what, and why
of other people’s actions. In a paper
published recently in Current Biology,
de Lange et al. [1] have addressed
the question of how our brain flexibly
switches between these various levels
by comparing brain activity while
people attend to the how or why of
other people’s actions.
Progress in this field suffered from
a division into two camps [2], who
have taken different views of how
the neural processes underlying
our understanding of what others
are doing. One of the camps has
taken the view that this involves
a process referred to as
mentalization — conscious thinking
about the state of minds of other
individuals [3]. Researchers in this
camp have emphasised data showing
that certain regions of the paracingulate
gyrus are activated when subjects
mentalize; Grezes et al. [4] and Brass
et al. [5] suggest that such regions can
provide information about ‘why’ other
people perform certain actions.
The other camp has emphasised
the importance of the ‘mirror neuron
system’. This view was originally
stimulated by research on monkeys,
in particular the discovery of single
cells in the monkey’s superior temporal
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Figure 1. Example of the stimuli used by de Lange et al. [1].sulcus that respond to the sound or
sight of other people’s actions,
providing sensory descriptions of
what other individuals do [6,7]. Later,
mirror neurons were discovered in the
monkey’s premotor, and posterior
parietal cortex [7–12]. Mirror neurons
fire when the monkey executes an
action, or when the monkey hears
[10,13] or sees [8,12] other individuals
perform similar actions. This
suggests that the monkey has brain
circuits that associate its actions with
those of others, providing an ‘inner
sense of action’ to the actions of
others [12].
A minority of mirror neurons (about
a third) respond only to the sight of
actions that match the effective
executed actions in minute detail [8],
providing a direct representation of
how the other individual performed the
action. The majority, however, also
respond if the monkey sees someone
perform a similar action using different
effectors, for example grasping with
the other hand, or with the mouth [8].
Such broadly congruent mirror
neurons activate various action
representations that differ in motor
details from the observed action but
achieve the same goal and could thus
convey a feeling for what the other
person does.
Two additional lines of evidence link
mirror neurons with what other people
do. First, most mirror neurons respond
to the sight of someone grasping an
object, but not if the same movement
is mimed without an object — two
actions that do not differ in terms of‘how’ the action is performed, but only
in ‘what’ is being done [8,11]. Second,
many mirror neurons also respond to
the sound of actions (for example, the
breaking of a peanut). Such sounds,
however, are emitted by the object,
and reflect what is being done without
containing explicit information about
how it has been done: was it broken
by two hands or by the mouth? The
fact that, in monkeys not engaged in
any explicit task, auditory mirror
neurons respond approximately
100 milliseconds after the onset of an
action sound [10,13] suggests that
their responses are spontaneous and
stimulus-driven.
Neuroimaging studies have
confirmed the presence of a similar
mirror neuron system in humans
[12,14–17]. Repetition suppression
paradigms have shown that some
regions within the mirror neuron
system represent the what and
others the how of other people’s
actions [17]. Other studies have found
that the what appears to be dominant:
viewing actions that have a familiar
goal, but are executed in unfamiliar
ways — for example, by a robotic
arm or by an effector the observer is
lacking — activates this system as
strongly as actions that match both in
terms of what and how [15,16]. Finally,
the sound of actions, deprived of direct
information about how the action
is done, also recruits the human
mirror system [14].
In constrast to investigators who
have considered mentalizing or
mirroring as competing accounts ofhow we perceive other people’s
actions [18], we have suggested that
these systems might integrate: in
particular, that mirror systems
translate perceived actions into motor
(and somatosensory [14,15,19])
representations of how and what
others do. These simulated
representations can later be
interrogated by more deliberate
mentalizing systems to reflect on
why other people acted [2]. De Lange
et al.’s [1] study now sheds further
light onto this relationship.
They presented their participants
with pictures of familiar actions such
as combing your hair. They compared
these images with images in which
either the how or what was
extraordinary (Figure 1). They found
that varying how the action was
performed had the strongest effect in
high-level visual areas. In regions
traditionally associated with the
mirror neuron system, thismanipulation
only had weak effects. In contrast,
changing what was done had the
strongest effect in the inferior frontal
gyrus often associated with the
mirror neuron system.
Comparing these inferior frontal
gyrus clusters with the regions of the
brain that show activity while
participants observed and executed
similar hand actions in another
experiment [15] — for example,
bringing a glass to the mouth — shows
that these inferior frontal gyrus clusters
were close to, but probably not within,
the mirror neuron system (Figure 2). In
the future, it will therefore be important
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paradigm while including a motor
execution task in the same
participants.
Interestingly, whether participants
were asked to decide if the means or
the intentions of the actions were
extraordinary had little effect on the
activity in the inferior frontal gyrus,
suggesting that the inferior frontal
gyrus activity was more stimulus than
task driven. In contrast, regions
traditionally associated with
mentalizing, such as the paracingulate
gyrus, were strongly affected by the
task. As participants examined how
the action was performed, these
regions were inhibited relative to rest
and did not differentiate between
ordinary and extraordinary actions,
but when participants paid attention
to people’s intentions, they were more
active (albeit still less than rest) and
differentiated between actions. This
supports the idea that mentalizing
regions can analyze other people’s
actions but only if the viewer decides
to reflect upon their goals, intentions
and beliefs [2]. The pattern of response
in these areas leaves a key question
for future experiments: what
computations on actions take place
in these areas?
The new work of de Lange et al. [1]
has thus finally shown that brain
regions involved in mentalizing, and
those close to the mirror neuron
system, can work in concert in the
brain, but do so only if participants
deliberately reflect on goals and
intentions. In addition, a large body
of evidence suggests that high level
visual areas and the mirror neuron
system process how [8,12,17] and
what [7–11,13–17,20] others do even
without explicit mentalizing [14–16].
Does this suggest that there is
a division of labour with mentalizing
areas processing why people act, the
mirror neuron system what they do,
and visual areas how they do it?
Probably not. In the opening example,
understanding that the professor
reached for the book to end the
conversation presupposes
a processing of what and how he does
it. For understanding why, visual areas
and regions of the mirror neuron
system computing how and what are
likely to be as important as mentalizing
areas. Also splitting how and what
between visual areas andmirror neuron
system is artificial: all mirror neurons
need visual input and different
mirror neurons represent both how
and what [12,15,16].
What this study [1] does show is that
our action perception system is highly
integrated, spanning the inferior frontal
gyrus associated with the mirror
neuron system and areas associated
with mentalizing [2]. What we try to find
out about other people’s actions,
however, determines how and where in
the brain processing takes place.
Hopefully this finding will shift people’s
attention away from fruitless
discussions about whether mirroring or
mentalizing is the basis of social
cognition, towards themore interesting
and still unanswered question of
what neural computations are
involved when we mentalize about
actions we mirror.
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